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A FAIRNESS DOCTRINE FOR THE PRESS
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Communications Commission is charged
with regulating the broadcasting industry under the author-
ity of the Federal Communications Act. The Act requires
that any person operating a broadcasting station be licensed
by the Commission and abide by its regulations. Section 315,
one of the restraints imposed by Congress on the individual
licensee, deals with the broadcast of political programs. It
provides:
If any licensee shall permit any person who is a
legally qualified candidate for any public office to
use a broadcasting station, he shall afford equal
opportunities to all other such candidates for that
office in the use of such broadcasting station: Pro-
vided, That such licensee shall have no power of
censorship over the material broadcast under the
provisions of this section.'
The basic purpose of section 315 was the promotion of
full and unrestricted, discussion of political issues by legally
qualified candidates.2 In 1941 the Commission undertook to
extend the spirit of this Act to non-political issues in the
community It said in Mayflower;
3
Freedom of speech on the radio must be broad
enough to provide full and equal opportunity for the
presentation to the public of all sides of public issues.
Indeed, as one licensed to operate in a public domain
the licensee has assumed the obligation of present-
ing all sides of important public questions, fairly,
objectively and without bias.
With the 1959 amendment of section 315 to include this
"fairness doctrine" there is an obligation upon the licensee
to present a fair coverage of public issues:
1. 47/ U.S.C. § 315 (1962).
2. Farmers Educ. & Co-op. Union of Am., North Dakota Div. v. WDAY, Inc.,
360 U.S. 525 (1959).
3. Mayflower Broadcasting Corp., 8 F.C.C. 333, 340 (1941).
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Nothing in the foregoing sentence shall be con-
strued as relieving broadcasters, in connection with
the presentation of newscasts, news interviews, news
documentaries, and on-the-spot coverage of news
events, from the obligation imposed upon them under
this chapter to operate in the public interest and to
afford reasonable opportunity for the discussion of
conflicting views on issues of public importance.
4
This section is an objective standard of operation in the pub-
lic interest, which is supposed to be the basis for granting
new licenses and for the renewal of present licenses.
The Commission felt that it was very important to keep
stations free to accommodate public service programs that
were inappropriate for commercial sponsorship. These are
known as sustaining programs. It also noted that there was
a balance to be maintained between commercial and sus-
taining programs, but did not specify what the balance
should be. They were fearful of a censorship charge, cen-
sorship being expressly forbidden by the Act. 5
EFFECT OF 315
Licenses in the broadcast field were limited to a three
year duration because Congress felt that the licensee held a
public trust, that he ought to account for his operations, and
that he should demonstrate that he was deserving of renewal
and conscious of his public service responsibilities.6 Adher-
ence to the "fairness doctrine" is presumably one of the fac-
tors judged in a license renewal hearing.
In a license renewal hearing the Commission must con-
sider the character and quality of the service to be rendered,,
and its function is not discharged without consideration of this
service judged against the standard of "public interest, con-
venience, or necessity "s
4. 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1962).
5. Cottone, panelist in FUND FOR THE REPUBLIC, ROADCASTING AND GOVERN-
MENT REGULATION IN A FREE SOCIETY, 20 (1959) 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1962).
6. Ibid.
7. KFKB Broadcasting Corp. v. F.R.C., 47 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1931).
8. N.B.C. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190-216, 217 (1943).
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In 1960, the Commission ruled that:
The principal ingredient of the licensee's obligation
to operate his station in the public interest is the
diligent, positive, and continuing effort by the licen-
see to discover and fulfill the tastes, needs, and
desires of his community or service area, for broad-
cast service. 9
When this ruling was challenged as a basis for denial of a
license, the Circuit Court upheld it, saying that the Commis-
sion could require the applicant to demonstrate an earnest
interest in serving local community needs by requiring
evidence of familiarity with them and an effort to meet them.10
With each application for a license or renewal, the li-
censee must submit a proposal of his projected programing
schedule showing the hours intended to be -allotted to cover-
age of public events, public issues, news, and general enter-
tainment. The disparity between application promises and
actual performance was not used for disciplinary purposes
until 1961. In KORD the Commission stated:
It is just as well established that the licensee
does have a duty to carry out substantially the
programming policies embodied in its proposal (or
in the alternative, to justify to the Commission why
there has been substantial departure therefrom) I
The Commission went on to say that the usual procedure
was to grant the renewal application where the applicant
substantially upgrades its programing proposals, and that
KORD had so done. But it granted only a one-year renewal
of license and said that this was to "make clear to broad-
casters the seriousness of the proposals made by them in the
application form."
12
It appears that now the prospective licensee must ap-
preciate the needs of the community he would serve and
make programing proposals which he intends to use and is
9. F.C.C., NETWORK PROGRAMING INQUIRY REPORT AND STATEMENT OF POLICY,
25 Fed. Reg. 7295 (July 29, 1960).
10. In Re Henry 30 F.C.C. 1021, 1025 (1961) aff'd, Henry v. F.C.C., 302 F.2d
191 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
11. In Re KORD, 31 F.C.C. 85 (1961).
12. Ibtd.
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capable of implementing, to meet those needs. Presumably,
this would include the usual proposal to give fair coverage
to community issues.
A "fairness doctrine" written for the press could be added
to the postal laws as a condition of entry as second class
mail, thus providing a sanction comparable to the ability
of the Commission to revoke a license. l3 Mailing privileges
could be withdrawn from any newspaper which did not pre-
sent a fair coverage of the issues in its community, particu-
larly those of a political nature. The inherent problem with
this proposal is that it may violate the present constitutional
limitations on licensing of the press.
CONSTITUTIONAL POSITION OF THE PRESS
The press is mentioned specifically in the First Amend-
ment while broadcasting is not. Principles governing the con-
trol of broadcasting, a limited access medium, cannot be ap-
plied to the press. Federal and state constitutions provide
that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom of speech
or the press. 1'4  The primary purpose of such provisions is
to prevent previous restraints upon publication; they do not
prevent the imposition of subsequent punishment for publica-
tion of material deemed contrary to public welfare. 15
With the exception of one case, 6 it has been uniformly
held that a newspaper is strictly private enterprise as dis-
tinguished from a business affected with a public interest,
and that its publisher is under no legal obligation to sell
advertising to anyone.17 For example, courts have held that
a publisher need not advertise official county proceedings. 8
13. POSTAL CENSORSHIP %nfra.
14. N.D. CONST., art. 1, § 9 See also, Englund v. Townley, 43 N.D. 118, 174
N.W 755 (1919).
15. Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907).
16. Uhlman v. Sherman, 22 Ohio N.P (n.s.) 225, 232-233 (1919). The news-
papers have caused the public to become dependent upon them, particularly for
"knowledge of these matters of public concern which vitally affect every citizen
and taxpayer." Patronage and dependence have clothed the newspaper with a
public interest and made them subject to reasonable regulations and demands
of the public.
17. See e.g., Re Louis Wahl, 50 F.2d 254 (D.Mich. 1931) Schuch v. Carrol
Daily Herald, 247 N.W 813 (Iowa 1933).
18. See Lake County v. Lake County Publishing & Printing Co., 280 Ill. 243,
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That the publisher was actuated by personal preferences or
caprice is wholly immaterial.19 The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari and dismissed an appeal from the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts for want of juris-
diction on this issue in 1963.20 The petition was for an order
directing the newspaper and its editor and publisher to print
certain letters to the editor The petitioner based this alleg-
ed duty on the rights of free speech and press as defined
and guaranteed by the constitutions of the United States and
Massachusetts. 21 Had the Court sustained the petitioner's con-
tention, the order might have compelled publication in two
ways. It might have declared that the editor, in deference
and in fairness to the opinions of others, had no right to edit
letters which he published. Or the Court might have ordered
that all letters submitted for publication must be published.
The latter course would prevent the publisher from retain-
ing effective control of his newspaper, force him to publish
free advertising, and could result in more letters than space
available.
Injunctive relief has been granted prohibiting enforcement
of a city ordinance requiring a license for a newspaper on the
basis that its utterances might disturb the peace. 22 The duty
of the city was to suppress the disorder and illegal acts, not
to prevent the legal publication of a newspaper 23 In 1925,
Minnesota passed a law which allowed abatement of a news-
paper as a nuisance. An attempted application of this statute
was declared unconstitutional by the United States Supreme
Court, saying, "It is no longer open to doubt that the liberty
of the press, and of speech, is within the liberty safeguarded
by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from
invasion by state action. ' 24 It would seem that the Supreme
117 N.E. 452 (1917) Wooster v. Mahaska County, 122 Iowa 300, 98 N.W 103
(1904).
19. See Commonwealth v. Boston Transcript Co., 249 Mass. 477, 144 N.E.
400 (1924).
20. Lord v. Winchester Star, 376 U.S. 221 (1963).
21. Brief for Respondants, p. 2, Lord v. Winchester Star, 190 N.E.2d 875
(Mass. 1963). The office of the writ of mandamus is to compel the performance
of some duty. There being no duty, the writ could not lie, and demurrer was
sustained.
22. Near v. State of Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) New Yorker Staats-
Zeitung v. Nolan, 89 N.J.Eq. 387, 105 At. 72 (1918).
23. New Yorker Staats-Zeitung v. Nolan, supra note 22, at 73.
24. Supra note 22, at 707.
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Court's position on prior censorship, confirmed in 1963 by
Lord v Winchester Star, would preclude any application of
a "fairness doctrine" to the press if a comparable license
sanction were involved. The postal regulations, per se, have
not been held a prior restraint, but the use of them for cen-
sorship has been forbidden. 25 This writer submits that append-
ing a "fairness doctrine" as a condition of entry as second
class mail would amount to censorship under this decision.
POSTAL CENSORSHIP
The term censorship has generally been used in two
senses. Primarily it is the prevention of expression and com-
munication. In a broader sense, censorship becomes a re-
striction after publication. 26 It is in the latter sense that
the post office practices censorship based on the assump-
tion that those capable of identifying error should prevent
its dissemination.
Entry as second class mail is a valuable privilege since
that mail is entitled to lower postage rates. Second class
mail embraces newspapers and other periodical publications.
The conditions for entry under this class are as follows:
first, the publication must be regularly issued at stated in-
tervals as frequently as four times a year, bearing the date
of its issue and consecutive numbers; second, it must be
issued from a known office of publication; third, it must be
originated and published for the dissemination of information
of a public character, or devoted to literature, the sciences,
the arts, or a special industry Finally, it must have a legiti-
mate list of subscribers.
2 7
The third condition was invoked in vain by the Postmaster
General to prevent the mailing of a magazine, which was
stipulated not obscene, by withdrawal of its second-class mail-
ing privileges .2  The United States Supreme Court held the
25. See Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146, 156 (1946).
26. McKEoN, MERTON & GELHORN, FREEDOM TO READ, foreward at xi, xii
(1957).
27. 39 U.S.C. § 4354(a) (1962).
28. Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946)
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conditions for entry to be objective, saying:
The provisions of the [third] condition would
have to be far more explicit for us to assume that
Congress made such a radical departure from our
traditions and undertook to clothe the Postmaster
General with the power to supervise the tastes of
the reading public of the country 29
The Postmaster General did not repeat this error In 1957,
the United States Supreme Court held that the mailing of
obscene material is punishable under a federal statute and
that the statute is competent to exclude matter from the
mails.3 0 The conviction was upheld with the words, "We hold
that obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally pro-
tected speech or press. ' 31 This constitutional question was
not raised in a later case which limited the definition of
obscenity32 The ad hoc censorship involved in the second
postage case would seem to conform to Near v Minnesota.3
It has been held that the admission of a publication to
the mails as second class matter is a positive right if the
publisher has fairly and fully complied with all the condi-
tions,34 and such privilege may be revoked only after a hear-
ing.3 5 Findings of the Postmaster General used to re-
voke second class mailing privileges, however, must be up-
held if not arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.36
The second class mailing privilege, like the "franking
privilege" of Congressmen, was instituted to aid the dissemina-
tion of vital news to the electorate. Any literature or art
could serve this purpose. Materials excluded from the mails,
usually obscene publications, are described as having no re-
deeming social value. Be this true, the excluding of such
29. Id. at 156.
30. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
31. Id. at 485.
32. Manual Enterprises v. Day, 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
33. For comparable decisions in the broadcast field see, Mile High Stations,
Inc., 28 F.C.C. 795 (1960). The first cease and desist order issued by the Federal
Communications Commission Palmetto Broadcasting Co., 33 F.C.C. 250 (1962).
A license revocation. Issue in these cases was obscenity.
34. United States ex rel. Rodriguez v. Weekly Publications, 68 F Supp. 767
(D.N.Y. 1946).
35. 39 U.S.C. § 4352(b) (1962).
36. Esquire, Inc. v. Walker, 55 F Supp. 1015 (D. D.C. 1944).
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materials is certainly within the spirit of the Federal Com-
munications Act. There is no reason why the government
ought to encourage the dissemination of obscenity
THE NEWS REQUIREMENT
There remains for discussion a postal regulation which
controls news content in a quantitative rather than qualita-
tive sense. It is this distinction which removes it from the
ambit of the "fairness doctrine." By statute, no newspaper
can retain its second class mailing permit if more than half
of its issues in any given year are comprised of more than
75 per cent of advertising.3 7 The government does not
intend to encourage the circulation of advertising for its own
sake. This statute sets forth an enforceable, objective stand-
ard to which newspapers are held. Moreover, the postal
charges are calculated on the percentages of advertising in
the total space of the newspaper, 3 which must be clearly
marked.
If a "fairness doctrine" was substituted for this require-
ment, the necessity of having an average of 12.5 per cent
of news in any given newspaper would disappear, and the
newspapers, like the broadcasting stations, could gain spon-
sorship of all their features, with the accompanying sponsor
control of news and editorial features. This would probably
not occur in a majority of the legitimate newspapers, but
the small news-sheet, established in a shopping center, and
designed to print only advertising, would lose what the
legislature intended to be the public service part of its con-
tent. It is independence from sponsorship and the use of
subscriptions which free the newspaper from the control
which advertisers exert over the broadcast media. A break-
down of broadcast advertising income in 1945 presents a
good illustration of the problem which might confront the
press in this situation. It showed that six or seven advertisers
provided 50 per cent of the network advertising. One such
37. 39 U.S.C. § 4352(c) (1962).
38. P.O.D. Forms 3541 § 3542 (Oct. 1962).
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advertiser often provided 20 per cent of the entire network
revenue. Profit or loss depended on one advertiser 19
Is FURTHER CONTROL DESIRABLE?
The answer to this question must take into account the
effect on the press itself and on the ultimate distributees of
the product of the press. Is further control necessary to en-
sure that the reader obtains information the press is not pro-
viding? Perhaps in pioneer days the electorate was ill-
informed, but with the multiplicity of news media today,
there is certainly a sufficient volume of news disseminated.
It is this multiplicity of media which ought to provide a
multiplicity of viewpoints, and, in fact, does so provide.
Every group has its house organ, a method of disseminating
its viewpoint to the public.
It is questionable whether the press should be required
to accept the responsibilities of a public utility through a
constitutional amendment. This would have little effect at the
distribution end since newspapers do not discriminate against
purchasers of individual copies. Forcing the newspaper to
accept certain advertising or to print certain news might
result in incarceration of publishers who were, as officials
judged, not properly presenting the news or the government's
version of it. This might have the not-so-incidental effect of
either ruling out all special-interest journals, 0 or forcing all
publishers to slant their publications so as to retain their ed-
itorial freedom.
This writer suggests that a statute applying a "fairness
doctrine" only to advertising would be largely ineffective. The
average newspaper is in no position to refuse advertising, and
in fact, does not do so. Presumably, any group with suf-
ficient funds to conduct an advertising campaign could es-
tablish a house organ for that purpose. Would not such a
regulation necessitate an abatement of the strictures of the
postal laws?
39. Durr. op. cit. supra note 5, at 10.
40. Special interest journals would include. institutional journals, party pub-
lications, the trade press, and the house organ.
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Further control of the press per se is not desirable; but
some control of the conditions in which the press is forced
to operate should be exercised, if only to insure that the
press survives.
the freedom to read-and freedom of communica-
tion generally-may be more deeply affected by gov-
ernmental acts affecting the economy and technology
of the various media than by acts attempting to
abridge or enlarge that freedom.
41
The First Amendment to the Constitution prohibits Con-
gress from either abridging the free exercise of religion or
legislating to aid in its establishment. The same prohibition
is applied to abridging freedom of the press, but there is
no comparable prohibition upon legislation intending to en-
large this freedom.
[T]he federal legislature is not forbidden to en-
gage in that positive enterprise of cultivation of
general intelligence upon which the success of self-
government so obviously depends. On the contrary,
in that positive field, the Congress of the United
States has a heavy and basic responsibility to pro-
mote the freedom of speech.
42
Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes
Congress to enact provisions for enlarging the freedom of
speech. Congress could thereunder pass laws which go much
farther than the second class mailing privileges in aiding
the press.
SUBSIDIES TO THE PRESS
A tax break given the newspaper would effectively allow
the accumulation of capital by the small publisher so he
could effectively compete with large groups. A ceiling could
be placed on the profit which could be earned by media as
is done with public utilities, guarantying this profit through
subsidy This might have a two-fold effect. First, it might
make the price for time or space low enough to allow smaller
41. McKeon supra note 26, at 78.
42. MEIKLEJOI-N, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19, 20 (1960).
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advertisers or educational institutions to utilize the media.
More important, it might induce the media to handle more
sustaining time at regular prices.
Advertisers usually prefer a one-newspaper town since it
costs twice as much to advertise in both competing papers.
When there is more than one newspaper in a city, usually
one is a dominant and paying venture. The other is general-
ly a losing proposition, resulting in more one-newspaper
cities each year Were it a question of filiance.. the decision
as to whether a town has to lose any of its newspapei -
should not be difficult to make. Considering the government's
duty to keep information flowing, it is difficult to understand
why newspapers, like farmers, should not receive parity pay-
ments in order to remain in business. A subsidy calculated
to provide operating capital would not necessarily interfere
with editorial freedom. This might well be acceptable gov-
ernmental action under the last clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
GOVERNMENT MEDIA
A government-financed network, accessible throughout
the nation, selling no advertising, could present all sides of
every public issue. It could present the news and cultural
programs which the networks refuse to present on the ground
that only the minority of society will watch such programs.
The government network could be utilized to give equal time;
it could be the answer for minority groups. The Federal
Communications Commission's licensing regulations could be
shaped so that governmental network stations were present
in every area. An even stricter "fairness doctrine" could
be written for this network, which, separated from the gov-
ernment by a corporate trust, would have no reason to be
unfair
A government press, on a national scale, presenting any
sort of news or cultural features would necessarily be com-
petitive with the commercial press. The constitutional dif-
ficulties might be avoided by restricting it to presenting
views of minority groups.
1964]
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This writer submits that no attempt should be made to
penalize the press for unfairness, but that the better course is
to encourage diversification of interests in press ownership
and management. The real answer to the problem of central-
ized communication is to maintain the minority viewpoint; the
most practicable means being a governmental broadcasting
system. It is in this area of spot news reporting, which
broadcasting has largely pre-empted from the press, that
minority groups are likely to encounter the limited-access
mpdiurn, che area where the government is then obligated
to give aid. And it is because of the limited-access aspect
that a "fairness doctrine" is the least expeditious. There can
be competition for existing facilities only where they are
limited.
Many stations and newspapers, each with an individual
viewpoint, will more adequately present minority views than
few stations and newspapers each presenting many viewpoints.
GLENN DILL
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